UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-7-2017

Medical Recovery Services v. Ugaki-Hicks
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44927

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Medical Recovery Services v. Ugaki-Hicks Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44927" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6846.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6846

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

*****
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

YVONNE UGAKI-HICKS, Defendant-Respondent,

*****
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

* ****
Supreme Court Docket No. 44927-2017

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bam1ock County.
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge, presiding.

*****
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant, Medical Recovery
Services, LLC
Yvonne Ugaki-Hicks, residing at Pocatello, Idaho, Respondent, Pro Se
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Medical Recovery Services, LLC. (hereinafter "MRS"), sued the defendant
Yvonne Ugaki-Hicks, (hereinafter "Hicks"), for the payment of a medical bill. The defendant was
served with the Complaint and Summons and after the time for appearance had expired, MRS
filed an application for entry of default and default judgment together with supporting
affidavits. The Magistrate Court denied MRS' application based upon I.R.C.P. SS(b)(2), stating
that MRS needed to provide written assignment of the debt. On appeal, the District Court
agreed with MRS that the applicable rule of civil procedure was I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1) and not I.R.C.P.
SS(b)(2) as this case deals with an amount that is a sum certain. But the District Court affirmed
the Magistrate Court's denial of entry of judgment on the alternative ground that MRS had not
provided an assignment evidencing its claim. MRS has alleged in its Complaint, which has been
deemed admitted by lack of answer, that the account was assigned and has by way of affidavit
testified to that assignment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, MRS filed a Complaint against Hicks, for the payment of a past due medical
bill. 1 MRS served Hicks with the Complaint on August 29, 2015. 2 On or about November 2,
2015, MRS filed its Application for Entry of Default, Application for Entry of Default Judgment
and Affidavit in Support of Application for Default Judgment. 3 On November 17, 2015, the
Magistrate Court entered its Order Regarding Default wherein it denied entry of default

1
2
3

R Vol. I pp 6-10.
R Vol. Ip 11.
R Vol. I pp 12-16.
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judgment stating "[s]ufficient proof of assignment of debt not shown as required in the court's
discretion to determine the truth of the claim; (IRCP 55(b)(2)." 4 MRS filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 2015
explaining that because this case involved a sum certain, I.R.C.P. 55(b)(l) applied and not
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). 5 On March 3, 2016, MRS submitted an additional Affidavit in Support of
Application for Default Judgment again attaching an "original instrument" evidencing the claim
and testifying by way of affidavit to the assignment of the debt. 6
On March 10, 2016, the Magistrate Court entered a Minute Entry and Order Denying
Motion to Reconsider explaining that the request for default was denied "because sufficient
proof of the assignment of debt was not shown as required in the court's discretion to
determine truth of the claim according to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)." 7 The Magistrate Court reasoned
that although "[p]laintiff filed an additional Affidavit in Support of Application for Default
Judgment, which Affidavit set forth that the debt was assigned to the Plaintiff, but did not
include an attachment which constituted sufficient proof of the assignment. The Affidavit of
Counsel is not sufficient proof." MRS filed a second Motion for Reconsideration and Brief in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration on June 13, 2016. 8 The Magistrate Court entered a
Minute Entry & Order Denying Second Motion for Reconsideration on June 15, 2016. 9 In that
order, the Magistrate Court heid that the "Court is still of the opinion, as it was on March 10,

4
5
6

7

8
9

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

I pp
I pp
I pp
I pp
I pp
I pp

17-18,
19-22.
23-26.
27-28.
29-35.
36-39.
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2016, that, whether it be under Rule 55(b)(1) or 55(b)(2), it has the authority, in its discretion,
to require written proof of the assignment of the debt which, to this Court is part and parcel of
providing the original instrument proving the debt since the Plaintiff also has to be the real
party in interest in order to sue on that instrument." The Magistrate Court entered a Judgment
dismissing MRS' Complaint on July 7, 2016. 10
MRS filed a Notice of Appeal on August 9, 2016 and filed Appellant's Brief on Appeal on
November 14, 2017." The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal
on February 17, 2017. 12 The District Court agreed "with MRS that I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) has no
application to the facts of this case and/or the issues raised in this appeal." However, the
District Court affirmed the decision of the Magistrate Court holding that the phrase "instrument
evidencing the claim" contained in I.R.C.P. 55(b)(l} allows the magistrate court to require a
written assignment of debt. Specifically, the District Court stated that "[c]ertainly, if the debt
has been assigned from the original creditor to another entity, such as M.R.S., part of
'evidencing the claim' would entail establishing the assignment. Otherwise any party could
assert this claim even though they were not the original creditor on the underlying debt." MRS
filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 10, 2017.13

10
11

12
13

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

I p 41.
I pp 43-45.
I pp 87-93.
I pp 94-96.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On August 17, 2015, MRS filed its Complaint and Summons. 14 On August 29, 2015, MRS
served the Complaint and Summons on Hicks. 15 On November 6, 2015, MRS filed Applications
for Entry of Default and Default Judgment. 16 On November 25, 2015, the Magistrate Court
entered and order denying entry of default.17 On December 16, 2015, MRS filed a Motion for
Reconsideration along with a Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. 18 On March 3,
2016, MRS filed an additional Affidavit in Support of Application for Default Judgment 19 which
the Magistrate Court denied on March 10, 2016 by way of Minute Entry and Order. 20
On June 8, 2016, MRS fiied a second Motion for Reconsideration and an additional Brief
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. 21 On June 15, 2016, the Magistrate Court entered a
Minute Entry and Order Denying Second Motion for Reconsideration.22 On July 7, 2016, the
Magistrate Court entered a Judgment of Dismissal without Prejudice. 23 On August 5, 2016, MRS
filed a Notice of Appeal 24 and on November 15, 2016 MRS filed the Appellant's Brief on
Appeal. 25

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

I pp 6-10.
I p 11.
I pp 12-16.
I pp 17-18.
I pp 19-22.
I pp 23-26.
I pp 27-28.
I pp 29-35.
I pp 36-39.
I p 41.
I pp 43-45.
I pp 66-74.
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On January 6, 2017, the District Court held oral argument, Hicks did not appear and
Joseph F. Hurley appeared on behalf of MRS. 26 On February 17, 2017, the District Court issued
its Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal affirming, on an alternative ground, the
Magistrate Court's refusal to enter default judgment.27
On March 10, 2017, MRS filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 28
ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT DEFAULT JUDGMENT COULD NOT BE ENTERED AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT AND WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT?

B.

IS MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER
I.C 12-120(1), (3) AND (5) AND I.A.R. 41?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing the dedsion of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate
court:
ft]he Sup :me Court reviews the triaf court (magistrate} record to determine

vvhether there ls bst;mti and competent evidence to support the maglstrat(/s
findings of fact and whether the me,2i,tr,rtP', conclusions of iaw follow from those
findings. If those findings are so supported and the condusions follow therefrom and if

the district court affirmed the magistrate:s decision, we affirm the district court's
decision as a matter of procedure. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970,
973 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,672, 183 P.3d 758, 760
(2008))."

Portfoiio Recovery Associates, LLC., v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho
does not review the decision

395 (2017). "Thus, this Court

the magistrate court." Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 859

(2013). "Rather, we [this Court] are 'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of

26
27

28

R Vol. I pp 85-86.
R Vol. I pp 87-93.
R Vol. I pp 94-96.
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the district court."' Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413,415 n.1 (2009)).
Here, the issue on appeal is the District Court's affirming the Magistrate Court's failure
to enter default judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(l). The standard of
review on questions of law is free review. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 644
(2006). "Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court exercises free review
over questions of law." Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 287 (2009). The Magistrate Court's
refusal to enter default judgment presents only a question of law as no questions of fact exist.
Accordingly, this Court should exercise free review.
I.
ARGUMENT

A.

THE DISTRICT AND MAGISTRATE COURTS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN THEY
REFUSED TO ENTER DEFAULT JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 1.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1) states in relevant part:
(1) For Sum Certain. If a claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be mode certain by
computation, the court, on the claimant's request, with an affidavit showing the
amount due, must order judgment for that amount and costs against the party who
has been defaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent
person and has been personally served, other than by publication or personal service

outside of this state. The affidavit must show the method of computation, together with
any original instrument evidencing the claim unless otherwise permitted by the court.
An application for a default judgment must also contain written certification of the
name of the party against whom judgment is requested and the address most likely to
give the defendant notice of the default judgment. The clerk must use this address in
giving the party notice of judgment.
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) states in relevant part that "[i]n all other cases ... [t]he court may
conduct hearings or make referrals when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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(A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any
allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter. (Emphasis added).
In this case, there is no dispute that MRS' claim against Hicks is for a sum certain and
therefore should be decided under I.R.C.P. SS(b)(1) and not 55(b)(1). The District Court agreed
and stated "I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) has no application to the facts of this case and/or the issues raised
in this appeal." 29 The District Court further stated that "to the extent that the trial court relied
upon I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) in denying M.R.S.'s application for default judgment, it was in error and
subject to reversal." 30
However, the District Court affirmed the Magistrate Court's refusal to grant MRS'
application for default judgment on the "basis that M.R.S. has failed to comply with I.R.C.P.
SS(b)(1) by failing to provide evidence of the claim." 31 The District Court reasoned that
"[c]ertainly, if the debt has been assigned from the original creditor to another entity, such as
M.R.S., part of 'evidencing the claim' would entail establishing the assignment. Otherwise any
party could assert this claim even though they were not the original creditor on the underlying
debt." 32
Although the District Court says MRS failed to provide evidence of the claim because it
failed to provide written evidence of an assignment, evidence of the assignment is properly
before the District and Magistrate Courts. In fact, this evidence is undisputed.
1.

29
30

31

32

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

All Well-Pleaded Allegations in the Comolaint are Deemed Admitted on Default,
and MRS Has Clearly Pleaded An Assignment That Hicks Has Not Disouted.

I p 89.
I p 91.
I p 91.
I p 91.
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The well-established rule in Idaho is that "[u]pon default by the defendant, the
allegations contained in the complaint are taken as true, and the plaintiff is relieved of any
obligation to introduce evidence in support of those allegations." Dominguez ex ref. Hamp v.

Evergreen Resources, Inc. 142 Idaho 7, 13 (2005). Specifically, "While I.R.C.P. 55{b)(2) vests the
court with discretion to conduct such hearings, or order such references as are necessary in
order to determine the amount of damages for which a party is liable, that Ruie does not

permit the court to Ignore

long-established precept

on ciefault all well pleadeci

allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted.)' Cement M,,sn,ns·-Employers 1 Trust v !(.ff

Davis, 107 Idaho

1133 (Ct.App.1985) (Reversing trial court that did not accept well

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as admitted in connection with default entered
Und Pr
- · I • RC
,•• D
, • cclb)l2'J'
-'--'1,.
\
}·
Here, the Complaint alleges the following:
3.
At all times mentioned herein the plaintiff was, and still
a licensed and
boncied collector under
laws of the State of [daho, and before the commencement
of this action the debt herein sued upon was assigned by SE! Anesthesia to the plaintiff
for the purpose of coliection. The plaintiff is now
holder thereof for such purposes.
Paragraph three of the Complaint is a well-pleaded factual allegation of an assignment
that Hicks has admitted to by failing to file an Answer. Given the well-established rule that all
well-pleaded factual allegations of a complaint are deemed admitted, this Court must accept as
true and conclusively proven the fact that the original creditor assigned the debt to MRS.
Although the Court has some discretion under Rule SS{b)(2), the Court does not have discretion
to ignore the fact that defendant has admitted the allegations of paragraph three of the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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Complaint and that those allegations are deemed conclusively proven.

2.

MRS Has Presented Uncontradicted Testimony of a Credible Witness That The
Debt Has Been Assigned to MRS.

This Court has explained another well-established rule which governs this situation:
The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of
an action, is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive,
uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently
improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial.
Manley v. Harvey Lumber Co., 175 Minn. 489,221 N.W. 913, 914. In Jeffrey v. Trouse, 100
Mont. 538, 50 Pac.2d 872, 874, it is held that neither the trial court nor a jury may
arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of
the modes known to the law, if such testimony does not exceed probability. And, in
Arundel v. Turk, 16 Cal.App.2d 293, 60 Pac.2d 486, 487, 488, the rule is stated thus:
'Testimony which is inherently improbable may be disregarded,*** but to warrant such
action there must exist either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its
falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions.
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626-27 (1979).
Here, MRS has submitted the Affidavit in Support of Application for Default Judgment
stating in relevant part:
7.
As the Attorney for MRS I have persona! knowledge of the contract(s)
between the providers and MRS assigning the accounts in this case to MRS for
collection. The applicable contract(s) designate the original service provider as
"Assignor" and MRS as "Assignee". The applicable contract(s) state, in relevant part:
"Assignor desires, from time to time during the term of this agreement, to submit to
Assignee for coliection certain claims, accounts or other evidences of indebtedness."
Accordingly, the account(s) at issue in this case were assigned at the moment MRS
received account information in this case from the provider for collection.
8.
Each of the accounts identified in Exhibit "A" have been assigned to MRS
because MRS has received the account information from the provider attached to this
Affidavit.
The testimony provided by MRS is from a credible witness, the testimony is
uncontroverted and is not inherently improbable. The District and Magistrate Courts "must
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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accept as true" the statement regarding assignment of the debt. Therefore, this Court should
reverse the decision of the District Court and reverse the Judgment entered by the Magistrate
Court dismissing MRS' Complaint without prejudice and remand this matter to the Magistrate
Court with instructions to enter default and default judgment against Hicks in the amount
specified by the plaintiff pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).

3.

The District Court and the Magistrate Court Committed Reversible Error by
Requiring Evidence of a Written Assignment Because Assignments Are Not
Required to Be in Writing.

Both the Magistrate and District Courts are of the opinion that they can require written
proof of the assignment of debt. However, neither Court provides any legal authority that an
assignment for collection of a debt must be in writing. To the contrary, case law old and new
and far and wide universally rejects the rule that assignments generally, and assignments for
the collection of debt specifically, must be in writing.
See Mangum v. Susser, 764 So.2d 653 (Ct.App.Fla.2000) (An assignment need not be in

writing to be valid); Dale, Inc. v. Killilea, 94 So.2d 146, 147 (Ct.App.La.1957)(A writing is not
required for assignment of a debt); Reisman v. Independence Realty Corp, 195 Misc. 260, 262,
89 N.Y.S.2d 763, 766 (1949) ("an assignment need not be in writing"); Ratsch v. Rengel, 23 A.2d
680, 682 (Md.1942) ("The law is also well settled that, in the absence of statutory requirement,
an assignment, or gift of a chose in action is not required to be in writing. It may effectively be
done by parole"); Mitchell v. Shoreridge Oil Co., 24 Cal.App.2d 382, 284, 75 P.2d 110, 111 (1939)
("With respect to the fact that the assignment of the claims for the purchase price of the
materials furnished by appellants was oral it is settled that there is no legal requirement that

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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such an assignment must be in writing"); Harlow v. Cook, 240 P.74 (Okla.1925) ("It is not error
to admit oral testimony to prove the sale or assignment of an account, where the plaintiff
pleads a verbal assignment, which defendant denies only by general denial, when there is no
conclusive proof that the assignment was in writing"); Goetz v. Zeif, 195 N.W. 874
(Wis.1923)(Assignment need not be in writing); Reynolds v. Gregg, 258 S.W. 1088
(Ct.App.Tx.1924) (Assignment of note need not be in writing); Lombard v. Balsley, 181111.App. 1
(1913) (Assignment of insurance policy as security need not be in writing); Singletary v.
Goeman, 123 S.W. 436 (Ct.App.Tx.1909) (An assignment of a debt need not be in writing.)
See also Hurley v. Bendel, 69 N.W. 477 (Minn.1896) (An assignment of accounts need

not be formal and need not be in writing where the owner of an account turns it over with an
agreement that it should be collected from the debtor); Donovan v. Halsey Fire-Engine Co., 24
N.W. 819 (Mich.1885) (It is not necessary to the valid transfer of a claim for money paid be in
writing); and Noyes v. Brown, 33 Vt. 431 (Vt.1860) (An oral assignment of a chose in action (i.e,
cause of action on a claim for recovery for money) is valid though not in writing.)
Although Idaho courts have not specifically ruled on whether an assignment must be in
writing, contracts in general in Idaho can be oral. See Bailey v. Peritus I Assets Mgmt., LLC, 162
Idaho 458,398 (2017) (general rule in Idaho is that oral contracts are enforceable unless they
fall in one of five primary categories). "'An assignment is a contract between the assignor and
the assignee."' Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 125
(2004) quoting Black's Law Dictionary 771 (7th ed. 1999).
Idaho Code§ 9-505 identifies only five agreements in Idaho that must be in writing.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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These are (1) an agreement which by its terms cannot be performed within one year; (2)
promise to pay the debt of another; (3) certain agreements made upon consideration of
marriage; (4) leasing real property longer than one year; and (5) lending money or extending
credit exceeding $50,000. Idaho law also requires that contracts for the sale of goods in excess
of $500 must be in writing. Idaho Code § 28-2-201(3){b). Importantly, no requirement exists
under§ 9-505 that an assignment must be in writing, and this case is not for the sale of goods.
And no Idaho case law supports the Courts' opinions that the assignment in this case must be in
writing. Accordingly, both the Magistrate and District Courts are requiring MRS to provide
written evidence in the form of an assignment that the law does not require to be in writing.
Because the law does not require assignments to be in writing, because the factual
allegations in MRS' Complaint are deemed admitted, and because MRS has by way of affidavit
established an assignment in this matter, this Court should reverse the decision of the District
Court and reverse the Judgment entered by the Magistrate Court dismissing MRS' Complaint
without prejudice and remand this matter to the Magistrate Court with instructions to enter
default and default judgment against Hicks pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55{b){1).
4.

The District and Magistrate Courts' Decisions Rewrite Rule 55(b)(l).

The express language of Rule S5(b){1) states that "[t]he affidavit must show the method
of computation, together with any original instrument evidencing the claim unless otherwise
permitted by the court." (Emphasis added). This rule requires the plaintiff to attach to the
affidavit for default judgment any original instrument evidencing the claim to the extent an

original instrument evidencing the claim exists. The express wording of Rule 55{b){1) does not
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say that the plaintiff must attach an original instrument evidencing the claim. There may not be
any original instrument evidencing the claim. For example, a plaintiff seeking to recover on an
oral contract can never attach an original instrument evidencing the claim. With respect to
assignment of debt, the District and Magistrate Courts are interpreting Rule SS(b)(l) that MRS
provide written evidence of an oral assignment or that MRS create a written assignment to
evidence their prior oral assignment. Rule SS(b)(l) requires neither. 33

B.

The District Court's Alternative Ground For Affirming The Magistrate Court Is Also In
Error.
After going through its assignment analysis, the District Court then held in a footnote

that alternative grounds exist to affirm the Magistrate Court's refusal to enter a default
judgment. 34 In this regard, an exhibit MRS attached to an affidavit in support of default
judgment could not be found by the District Court on appeal. MRS filed this exhibit to satisfy
the Magistrate Court's concerns that MRS provide an "original instrument evidencing the
claim." Because that exhibit cannot be found in the appellate record, the District Court stated
the following:
As a result, regardless of this Court's decision regarding the merits of the issues
raised on this appeal, it appears that the Court must AFFIRM the trial court's refusal to
enter default judgment on alternative grounds. M.R.S.'s failure to provide the 'original

33

The District and Magistrate Courts are essentially mandating what they feel is the necessary quantum of proof

they need before they will accept evidence establishing an assignment of debt. In this process, they reject Hicks'
admission of fact by virtue of her failure to dispute the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint on the
assignment issue and they reject the credible and uncontroverted Affidavit of Attorney Bryan N. Zollinger
establishing an assignment of debt. In fact, the District Court goes so far as to say that an affidavit from the
original creditor "would certainly qualify as evidence of the claim." But apparently an affidavit from the collection

agency or its attorney licensed under the laws of Idaho and therefore subject to ethical rules of honesty in fact is
not sufficient. See R Vol. pp. 91-92 fn. 4. The bottom line is that the District and Magistrate Courts are weighing
the evidence on default rather than ruling on its admissibility.
34

Vol 1, p. 98, fn. 2.
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instrument evidencing the claim' as required by I.R.C.P. SS(b)(l). 35
But the District Court's alternative ground for affirming the Magistrate Court is also in
error because there is no "original instrument evidencing the claim." MRS appears frequently
before the Magistrate Court involved in this appeal. This Magistrate Court requires that MRS
provide some document to serve as an "original instrument evidencing the claim" before MRS
can obtain a default judgment just like it requires MRS to provide some document to serve as
an original instrument evidencing the assignment. To satisfy the Magistrate Court, MRS
routinely submits electronic "billing statements" to the Magistrate Court who accepts them as
"original instruments evidencing the claim." MRS does not believe nor has it ever believed that
an electronic billing statement constitutes an original instrument. The term instrument is a
legal term of art defined as follows:
A formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or
lease. A writing that satisfies the requisites of negotiability prescribed by U.C.C. Art. 3.
A negotiable instrument (defined in U.C.C. § 3-104, or a security (defined in U.C.C. § 8102) or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not
itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of
business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.
Black's Law Dictionary 801 (6th ed. 1995).
Given this definition, MRS submits that an "instrument" is a document whose writing
conveys independent legal significance. For example, contracts, wills, liens, deeds, mortgages,
recorded judgments, etc. are all written documents. But because they are written documents
that convey independent legal significance they are also written instruments. Electronic billing
statements do not convey any independent legal significance. They simply convey information.

35

Vol 1, p. 98, fn. 2.
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Therefore, they are documents but not "instruments."
Although a contract for medical services could very well be a written contract and
therefore an "original instrument evidencing the claim," most of the time when a person
receives medical services, there is no formal written agreement but instead an implied in fact
agreement between the parties where the doctor provides care and treatment for which the
patient agrees to pay the reasonable value of those services. This case illustrates this point
because the original creditor was SEI Anesthesia. Patients rarely if ever even know the identity
of their anesthesiologist let alone sign a written contract for anesthesiology services.
Therefore, in the world of medical collections, most of the time there is no "original instrument
evidencing the claim" because the patients most often do not sign a written contract.
Here, the District Court's alternative ground for affirming the Magistrate Court is that
there is no evidence in the record of an "original instrument evidencing the claim" because the
document purporting to show such was not attached to the affidavit in support of default
judgment. MRS does not know why the exhibit attached to the affidavit in support of default
judgment is not in the record on appeal. Nor does it really matter because MRS will agree on
appeal that there is no evidence in the record of an "original instrument evidencing the
claim" -not because the exhibit is missing from the record, but because there simply is no
"original instrument" or "written contract" between SEI Anesthesia and Hicks. 36 And the
missing billing statements that are not attached to the affidavit in support of default do not
constitute "original instruments evidencing a claim." The fact that these billing statements are

36

The only reason MRS attached the electronic billing statements was to satisfy the Magistrate Court who

routinely accepts them as "original instruments."
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not part of the record on appeal is irrelevant because even if they were part of the record they
would not constitute "original instruments evidencing a claim."
Moreover, the Magistrate Court limited its decision to the assignment issue. It never
raised any issue about a lack of any "original instrument evidencing the claim." If the
Magistrate Court had denied entry of default judgment because the exhibit was missing from
the affidavit in support of default, MRS could have taken steps to address the issue. But it was
not an issue for the Magistrate Court presumably because it had what it felt it needed to satisfy
the "original instrument evidencing the claim" requirement. In any event, the missing exhibit
was not an issue for the Magistrate Court, and MRS admits on appeal that the missing exhibit
was not an "original instrument evidencing a claim" because no such document exists.
Therefore, the District Court's alternative ground for affirming the Magistrate Court is in error.
11.

MRS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL
Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules permits the award of costs to the prevailing party
on appeal. Rule 40 states, "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party
unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." As the prevailing party on appeal,
MRS is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Rule 40. Similarly, Rule 41 provides for an
award of attorney's fees. A prevailing party on appeal is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal if
that prevailing party was entitled to attorney's fees before the lower court. Action Collection
Servs., Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286,291, 192 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Ct. App. 2008).

In this case, MRS was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. §12-120(1) & (3) before
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the Magistrate Court because this matter was filed as a civil action to recover on an open
account, account stated, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of services within the
meaning of Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 37 Moreover, the amount pleaded in the Complaint was
also less than thirtv-five thousand dollars and written demand for payment was made not less
than ten days before commencement of the action. 38 Because MRS was entitled to fees
pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1) & (3) before the Magistrate Court, MRS is also entitled to its
appellate attorney's fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in this Brief, MRS respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal which affirmed on
alternative grounds the Magistrate Court's refusal to enter default judgment. MRS further
requests that this Court remand this matter to the Magistrate Court with instructions to enter
default and default judgment against the defendant in the amount specified by the plaintiff
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).

}-r

DATED this~-~- day of November, 2017.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

Bryan N. 2ollinger
Attorneys for Appellant
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